{"id":439,"date":"2021-11-01T09:27:54","date_gmt":"2021-11-01T09:27:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/?p=439"},"modified":"2021-11-01T09:29:55","modified_gmt":"2021-11-01T09:29:55","slug":"the-taiwan-conflict-the-us-dilemma","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/index.php\/2021\/11\/01\/the-taiwan-conflict-the-us-dilemma\/","title":{"rendered":"The Taiwan Conflict: The US Dilemma"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>By BM Jain, Chief Consultant, CASPEGS<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>China poses a gargantuan threat to Taiwan\u2019s national security and survival ever since the US-China confrontation has occupied a centre stage on the issue of free navigation in the South China Sea. To deter the US threat, China has deployed anti-ship ballistic missiles&nbsp;in the&nbsp;South China Sea. On the other hand, America has moral obligation to protect Taiwan\u2019s autonomy against China\u2019s military offensive by selling advanced weapon systems to Taipei, even though America terminated the mutual defence pact with Taiwan in 1979. Moreover, America has despatched its aircraft carrier in the Taiwan Strait to stave off China\u2019s imminent threat to Taiwan\u2019s security. Also, America has established forward bases in the Indo-Pacific, while realizing that the \u201cmilitary balance\u201d in the Asia-Pacific region is fast shifting against it.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Realistically enough, China has developed an overwhelming maritime capability to deal with the US threat in the Taiwan strait. Admiral Phil Davidson, then head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,&nbsp;\u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/opinion\/articles\/2021-10-13\/u-s-troops-and-chinese-planes-have-taiwan-closer-to-crisis\">warned&nbsp;<\/a>that there was a significant possibility of an attack on Taiwan in the next six years.\u201d&nbsp; If viewed from a strategic prism, President Xi Jinping has set the \u201cred lines\u201d on the Taiwanese issue. He has made it clear that China is determined to complete the process of reunification between Beijing and Taipei, even though it has to use force. This scenario has, of course, heightened tension in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2><strong>The One China Principle:&nbsp; the root cause of Friction<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>A new era of d\u00e9tente in China-US relations began with a secret trip of Henry Kissinger, President Richard Nixon\u2019s Assistant for National Security Affairs, to China in July 1971. His visit prepared a propitious environment for President Richard Nixon\u2019s historic visit to China in 1972, with an intent to jumpstart the formal process of normalizing relations between America and China. At the end of Nixon-Kissinger\u2019s visit, a joint statement, the Shanghai communique, was issued. Under the communique, America explicitly endorsed the One China principle, while simultaneously underscored to maintain its unofficial relations with Taiwan. In other words, Nixon made it clear that America would not support Taiwan\u2019s \u201c<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wilsoncenter.org\/blog-post\/nixon-goes-to-china\">independence movement<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Kissinger also acknowledged in an interview that America did that arrangement in order to avoid a \u201cmajor confrontation\u201d with China. But at the same time Kissinger reiterated that America had kept&nbsp; the option open for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue,&nbsp; while advising &nbsp; Taiwan not to&nbsp; declare a formal independence. He<a href=\"https:\/\/www.pbs.org\/wgbh\/pages\/frontline\/shows\/china\/interviews\/kissinger.html\">&nbsp;stated<\/a>, \u201cOne, we should maintain the \u2018one China\u2019 policy that every American president has articulated, including President Reagan. Secondly, we should make clear that we want a peaceful resolution. And three, Taiwan should not challenge that arrangement in a way that will provoke a conflict. Those are three perfectly clear principles.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>That policy worked well for over three decades. But things have changed with President Xi Jinping\u2019s \u201cassertive\u201d Chinese foreign policy in contrast to his predecessors\u2019 low-profile approach. President Xi has been occasionally reminding America of its past commitment to a One-China policy, meaning China\u2019s legitimate right to reunify Taiwan either through peaceful or coercive means. In this scenario, America is faced with a grave dilemma. If it does not effectively respond to China\u2019s military offensive against Taiwan, it will send wrong signals to its allies like Japan and South Korea that America is not a dependable partner as proven in the case of Afghanistan that was left in the lurch when the Taliban captured Kabul without any resistance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It is, however, a matter of conjecture whether or not America would come to Taiwan\u2019s rescue if China were to attack it militarily.\u00a0 But for sure, the Biden administration has given clear signals to avoid a conflict with China over the brewing tension in the Taiwan Strait. On January 23, 2021, the Biden administration issued a statement \u201cPRC Military Pressure Against Taiwan Threatens Regional Peace and Stability.\u201d The\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/cdn.cfr.org\/sites\/default\/files\/report_pdf\/the-united-states-china-and-taiwan-a-strategy-to-prevent-war.pdf\">statement<\/a>\u00a0\u201curged Beijing to \u2018cease its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure against Taiwan and instead engage in meaningful dialogue with Taiwan\u2019s democratically elected representatives.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In other words, President Biden is trying to reset Washington\u2019s ties with Beijing in order to help reshape the \u201cgeopolitical landscape\u201d in coming decades. But in case China goes to war with Taiwan, America will have a limited option\u2014garnering military and strategic support from Japan and its other allied partners to \u201ckeep the war limited\u201d.&nbsp; But the notion of limited war, in practice, is unfeasible once a full-fledged military operation is launched against Taiwan by China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p>The Biden administration has realized that given China\u2019s aggressive behaviour towards Taiwan, American foreign policy will need to make tactical adjustments to the murky strategic environment in the region. At the same time, the parties involved in a tug of war\u2014 America, China and Taiwan\u2014 are called upon to pursue the strategic \u201cdoctrine of restraint\u201d as well as to avoid using the belligerent tones on both sides. Undoubtedly, Taiwan is a litmus test for the Biden administration\u2019s foreign policy and diplomacy. The administration is gripped by the dilemma of maintaining the good relationship with China on the one hand, and safeguarding Taiwan\u2019s autonomy and security against an impending Chinese threat on the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Source:<a href=\"https:\/\/www.eurasiareview.com\/29102021-the-taiwan-conflict-litmus-test-for-america\/\" data-type=\"URL\" data-id=\"https:\/\/www.eurasiareview.com\/29102021-the-taiwan-conflict-litmus-test-for-america\/\"> Eurasia Review<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Views are personal.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By BM Jain, Chief Consultant, CASPEGS China poses a gargantuan threat to Taiwan\u2019s national security and survival ever since the US-China confrontation has occupied a centre stage on the issue [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[24],"tags":[37,34,17,38],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/439"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=439"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/439\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":440,"href":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/439\/revisions\/440"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=439"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=439"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=439"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}