{"id":480,"date":"2022-03-25T14:57:17","date_gmt":"2022-03-25T14:57:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/?p=480"},"modified":"2022-03-26T03:06:40","modified_gmt":"2022-03-26T03:06:40","slug":"a-new-iron-curtain","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/caspegs.org\/index.php\/2022\/03\/25\/a-new-iron-curtain\/","title":{"rendered":"A New \u201cIron Curtain\u201d?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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By Chen Wang<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Despite the heroic Ukrainian resistance, Ukraine\u2019s fate for its independence was determined the moment the US announced it would not send its troops to Ukraine in any circumstances to prevent direct conflict with Russia.[i]<\/sup><\/a> With the reality of the great power politics where \u201cthe strong do what they can and weak suffer what they must,\u201d[ii]<\/sup><\/a> we can reasonably assume that Russia\u2019s superior military strength and its resolve to stop the NATO expansion will eventually coerce Ukraine into accommodating Russia\u2019s security preference.[iii]<\/sup><\/a> Contrary to the certainty of Ukraine\u2019s NATO bid, there is a lack of meaningful debate on the implications of the Russian invasion on international politics. A number of prominent scholars and policy makers have argued that the fall of Ukraine will lead to a new \u201ciron curtain\u201d which will  speed up the realignment of the geo-political relations between the US, Europe, Russia, and China into an ideologically divided world with the background of the salient US-China geo-economic and technological competition.[iv]<\/sup><\/a> However, if we take a closer look, underneath this popular self-reinforcing belief, Russia\u2019s invasion might have very limited effects on lowering the new \u201ciron curtain\u201d due to the stickiness of the existing complex interdependent global economic cooperation. Counter intuitively, the absence of the US leadership and its opportunistic behaviour in this crisis might create a new space for China as a rising power to play a larger role in maintaining the existing global economic cooperation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With the symbolic economic sanctions and popular boycotts[v]<\/sup><\/a>, the Western societies are crafting a self-reinforcing narrative with the help from its mainstream media that interprets the Russian invasion through an ideological lens\u2014the authoritarian dictator is encroaching on the Ukrainian democracy and independence. The argument goes that Russia\u2019s invasion not only pushed the previously indecisive Europe to join the US to contain Russia\u2019s authoritarian expansion, it also facilitated a conducive environment for deeper strategic cooperation between China and Russia \u2013 two authoritarian powers in Eurasia that already possess great incentives to resist US pressures[vi]<\/sup><\/a> \u2013 to challenge a more unified democratic West. Putting aside the naivet\u00e9 of understanding today\u2019s international politics through an ideological lens, this line of self-centered arguments overlooks the positive-sum economic benefits of the existing interdependent global economic cooperation, the divergent interests of different actors within the same ideological camp as well as severely underestimating the associated costs to re-construct global economic cooperation based on \u201clike-mindedness\u201d or ideological preference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, there is no doubt that Russia\u2019s invasion has significantly changed the EU’s calculation of its security as a geo-political actor. With a long history of being dominated by Russia, the Eastern European countries are fearful of their own territorial integrity and political independence as the Russian tanks roll into Ukraine. For the Western European countries, they are rightfully concerned about the economic uncertainty and the refugee problem because of the military conflict in Ukraine.[vii]<\/sup><\/a> Facing these security challenges, without a capable European security force, Europe has no other choice but to rely on US security protection under NATO. In other words, Russia\u2019s invasion granted the US tremendous leverage over its European allies. In the realism-dominated international politics, this leverage means that Europe would need to bind itself more closely with the US foreign policy at the cost of its own economic benefits. Thus, the real question is whether the European countries can afford to prioritize ideological coherence in their foreign policy over economic benefits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

With the existing complex interdependent economic structure, the answer is likely to be negative for Europe due to its economy\u2019s dependency on China\u2019s export market and Russia\u2019s energy. In essence, the economic sanctions are a mutually hurting stalemate where the party which has higher tolerance in enduring economic pain obtains the position of strength in bargaining. If we accept this rational logic, Europe is the most vulnerable among the four major geo-political players. For instance, China has become the largest trading partner with the major European economies like Germany[viii]<\/sup><\/a> while Russia provides more than one third of Europe\u2019s energy supplies.[ix]<\/sup><\/a>Facing severe challenges in the post-Covid economic recovery, it is questionable that the European economy can afford to stay behind this new \u201ciron curtain.\u201d Although it is too soon for any concrete evidence on Europe\u2019s policy change, the progress of the EU\u2013China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and the continuing energy imports from Russia can serve as the key indicators. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second externality of Russia\u2019s invasion is that it leads to a closer strategic partnership between Russia and China which was cited by many scholars as the evidence to justify the new \u201ciron curtain\u201d belief. It is true that the Western sanctions have pushed Russia towards China (for example, forming a strategic partnership based on their mutual interest in balancing against the US challenge). Notably , Russia and China issued a critical joint statement\u2014the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development\u2014during the Beijing Olympic.[x]<\/sup><\/a> This joint statement sends a strong signal of the Sino-Russia strategic partnership in challenging the US-led international order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, a strong China-Russia alliance appears to be problematic in view of China\u2019s looking upon the  Taiwan issue from the angle of its sovereignty claim. This divergence of national interest prevented China from neither recognizing Crimea in 2014 nor being supportive of the separatist movement in the Donbas region. In other words, this strategic partnership is largely transactional in nature to balance against the US hegemony instead of trying to export some shared authoritarian ideology abroad.  Furthermore, China and Russia also have deep historical mutual distrust. Thus, despite the recent developments of the US-China de-coupling and China-Russia strategic partnership, China still shares a lot more common interests with the US than with Russia. For example, both the US and China have incentives (quite frankly need each other) to maintain the existing international economic cooperation as China needs it for its further development while the US needs it to maintain its global leadership (for example, ensuring the US dollar as reserve currency).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Contrary to the self-fulfilling belief that Russia\u2019s invasion will lead to a new \u201ciron curtain\u201d that divides the world into two ideological camps, the Ukraine crisis is more likely to plant the seed for the further deterioration of the cross Atlantic alliance in the long term. America is likely to emerge as a major beneficiary of the Ukraine crisis, from increasing its geopolitical leverage in Europe to ensuring a strong dollar after the unprecedented quantitative easing, after it openly encouraged Ukraine to join NATO but also \u201cgiving a green light for Russia to invade.\u201d However, these short-term gains are at the expense of its European allies\u2019 security and economic well-being. In an increasingly multi-polar world, the current US strategies are not without long-term costs in its leadership.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

This absence of leadership presents China with a unique opportunity as one of the benefactors of the existing international economic cooperation to construct an alternative paradigm in the Euro-Asia landmass that focuses more on the positive-sum economic cooperation than the zero-sum ideological struggles. This demand for global leadership is aligned with China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and economic diplomacy in general.[xi]<\/sup><\/a> If we learned anything from the Cold War, it would be a pragmatic partnership that emerged from the positive-sum economic interests, which will almost always be more powerful and resilient than the alliance that is based on the ideological coherence. However, this opportunity also entails many strategic challenges for China as a rising power within the existing international order. For one, China needs to balance between its long-term political and economic interests and short-term geo-political securities in the wake of the Russian invasion. These challenges not only require China to maintain its strategic patience (such as, controlling its domestic nationalism) over  many hot-button issues like Taiwan but also demand its willingness to further invest to safeguard the stable international economic cooperation for its own benefits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chen Wang is an independent researcher based in the United States and a managing partner of Roger & Rebecca LLC, a <\/em><\/span>business services company. He is an alumnus of UC Berkeley where he studied international relations and China\u2019s foreign security and econom<\/em>ic policies. <\/em><\/span>Views are personal.<\/span> <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Notes<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
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[i]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cBiden Says He Won’t Send US Troops to Ukraine to Deter Russian Threat,\u201d The Guardian (Guardian News and Media, December 8, 2021), https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/world\/2021\/dec\/08\/russia-talks-of-rapid-ukraine-discussions-after-biden-putin-summit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[ii]<\/sup><\/a> Thucydides, Martin Hammond, and P. J. Rhodes, The Peloponnesian War<\/em> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[iii]<\/sup><\/a> Samuel Charap and Scott Boston, \u201cU.S. Military Aid to Ukraine: A Silver Bullet?,\u201d RAND Corporation, January 21, 2022, https:\/\/www.rand.org\/blog\/2022\/01\/us-military-aid-to-ukraine-a-silver-bullet.html.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[iv]<\/sup><\/a>Yuhan Zhang and Cheng Chang, “Modeling the US-China Trade Conflict: A Utility Theory Approach”, Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computation 5(2), 2021,<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[v]<\/sup><\/a> Jordan Mendoza, \u201cFrom Soccer to Iphones to Cats, Here Are Some Sanctions, Bans and Boycotts Placed on Russia,\u201d USA Today (Gannett Satellite Information Network, March 6, 2022), https:\/\/www.usatoday.com\/story\/news\/politics\/2022\/02\/28\/sanctions-bans-boycotts-russia\/9322671002\/.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[vi]<\/sup><\/a> Stephanie Pezard, Ashley Rhoades, \u201cWhat Provokes Putin\u2019s Russia?\u201d, Rand Corporation, January 2020, https:\/\/www.rand.org\/content\/dam\/rand\/pubs\/perspectives\/PE300\/PE338\/RAND_PE338.pdf<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[vii]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cEurope and the Refugee Crisis: A Challenge to Our Civilization,\u201d United Nations (United Nations), accessed February 12, 2022, https:\/\/www.un.org\/en\/academic-impact\/europe-and-refugee-crisis-challenge-our-civilization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[viii]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cChina Remains Germany’s Top Trading Partner in 2020,\u201d Xinhua, accessed February 12, 2022, http:\/\/www.xinhuanet.com\/english\/europe\/2021-02\/22\/c_139759486.htm.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[ix]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cHow Will Europe Cope If Russia Cuts off Its Gas?,\u201d The Economist (The Economist Newspaper), accessed February 12, 2022, https:\/\/www.economist.com\/europe\/2022\/01\/29\/how-will-europe-cope-if-russia-cuts-off-its-gas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[x]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cJoint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development,\u201d President of Russia, February 4, 2022, http:\/\/en.kremlin.ru\/supplement\/5770.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xi]<\/sup><\/a> Chen Wang, \u201cDomestic Conditions Challenge China’s Economic Diplomacy,\u201d East Asia Forum, January 27, 2022, https:\/\/www.eastasiaforum.org\/2022\/01\/28\/domestic-conditions-challenge-chinas-economic-diplomacy\/.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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